Recommended Journal Articles

Short list of recommended journal articles

  • Zhang, Yahong, and Min-Hyu Kim. "Do Public Corruption Convictions Influence Citizens’ Trust in Government? The Answer Might Not Be a Simple Yes or No." The American Review of Public Administration (2017): 0275074017728792.

​Abstract

The influence of corruption convictions on government trust is complicated. On one hand, they may reflect the severity of corruption in a jurisdiction. On the other hand, they might indicate the degree of anticorruption efforts. Existing literature has suggested the severity of corruption’s negative effects and the positive effect of anticorruption efforts on institutional trust. This research synthesized existing studies, identified the intellectual puzzle in the literature, and developed open hypotheses to investigate the way in which corruption convictions systematically affect citizens’ trust in government. State- level panel data merged from different sources were used for the empirical analyses. The results showed a positive influence of corruption convictions on public trust in government. 


  • Klein Haarhuis, Carolien M., and Frans L. Leeuw. "Fighting governmental corruption: the new World Bank programme evaluated." Journal of international development 16, no. 4 (2004): 547-561.

Abstract

Over the past decade, the international donor community has come up with a range of initiatives to curb governmental corruption in developing countries. Top-down approaches devise administrative and judicial reforms, whereas bottom-up approaches deal with the process of awareness - raising in civil society. The World Bank currently integrates these top-down and bottom-up approaches in a combined anti-corruption programme. In this paper, the most recent version of this World Bank's training programme is reconstructed and assessed. Several core approaches in the programme, such as the strengthening of civil society and the privatisation of parastatals, turn out to have unintended consequences. The empirical support is largely case-specific and turns out to be highly conditional. It is concluded that indicators need to be developed to assess the relevance of national anti-corruption policies to country-specific governance and anti-corruption conditions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • Eric C. C. Chang and Yun-han Chu (2006). Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies? Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 2, p. 259-271.

Abstract

While voluminous studies have attributed the continuing decline of institutional trust to political corruption, the link between corruption and institutional trust in Asia has yet to be explored systematically. Testing the effect of corruption on institutional trust is theoretically important and empirically challenging, since many suggest that contextual factors in Asia, such as political culture and electoral politics, might neutralize the negative impact of corruption. Utilizing data from the East Asia Barometer, we find a strong trust-eroding effect of political corruption in Asian democracies. We also find no evidence that contextual factors lessen the corruption-trust link in Asia. The trust-eroding effect holds uniformly across all countries examined in this study and remains robust even after taking into account the endogenous relationship between corruption and trust.


  • Margit Tavits (2007) Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, p. 218-229.

Abstract

 This article demonstrates that political institutions influence the level of corruption via clarity of responsibility. The key hypothesis is that when political institutions provide high clarity of responsibility, politicians face incentives to pursue good policies and reduce corruption. These incentives are induced by the electorates' rejection of incumbents who do not provide satisfactory outcomes. However, if lines of responsibility are not clear, the ability of voters to evaluate and punish politicians2014as well as to create incentives for performance2014declines. The findings confirm that countries with institutions that allow for greater clarity of responsibility have lower levels of corruption.


  • Joarder Mohammad Abdul Munim (2010). Fiscal capacity and multiple-equilibria of corruption: Cross-country evidence. Journal of International Development. ShahJalal University of Science and Technology, Sylhet, Bangladesh

Abstract

 We test the proposition that higher initial fiscal capacity of a nation strengthens law and order, and therefore, inhibit corruption, and in a multiple-equilibria setting, the economy will move towards the low-corruption stable equilibrium. We have found a significant relationship between more initial fiscal capacity and less corruption in a large cross-section of countries that became independent after World War II. Our findings also suggest that higher initial revenue capacity is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition to reduce corruption. A government's willingness (benevolence) is also needed to combat corruption. Both of these variables help the economy to converge towards a lsquolow-corruption stable equilibriumrsquo. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • Bryane Michael (2004) Explaining organizational change in international development: the role of complexity in anti-corruption work. Journal of International Development, Vol. 16, No. 8, p. 1067-1088.

Abstract

 What explains the rapid expansion of programmes undertaken by donor agencies which may be labelled as lsquoanti-corruption programmesrsquo in the 1990s? There are four schools of anti-corruption project practice: universalistic, state-centric, society-centric, and critical schools of practice. Yet, none can explain the expansion of anti-corruption projects. A lsquocomplexity perspectiversquo offers a new framework for looking at such growth. Such a complexity perspective addresses how project managers, by strategically interacting, can create emergent and evolutionary expansionary self-organisation. Throughout the lsquofirst waversquo of anti-corruption activity in the 1990s, such self-organization was largely due to World Bank sponsored national anti-corruption programmes. More broadly, the experience of the first wave of anti-corruption practice sheds light on development theory and practice - helping to explain new development practice with its stress on multi-layeredness, participation, and indigenous knowledge. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • Damarys Canache and Michael E. Allison. (2005) Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies. Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 47, No. 3, p. 91-111.

Abstract

Political corruption poses a serious threat to the stability of developing democracies by eroding the links between citizens and governments. Using data on national levels of corruption (Transparency International 1997 CPI index) and individual opinion (1995-97 World Values Survey), this study finds that Latin Americans are quite aware of the seriousness of corruption in their countries. The ensuing question is whether citizens can connect their views about corruption to appraisals of their authorities and institutions and of democracy more generally. Collectively, the findings suggest that they can, and that the necessary ingredients for accountability are present in Latin America. The possible dark side of mass opinion on corruption is that pervasive misconduct may poison public sentiment toward democratic politics. On this score, the analysis found that this attitude affected only support for specific administrations and institutions.


  • Alex M. Mutebi (2008) Explaining the Failure of Thailand's Anti-corruption Regime. Development and Change, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 147-171.

Abstract

 Despite the presence of strong anti-corruption policies, state and regulatory capture may persist and thrive in the highest echelons of government. This article explores such a case, that of Thailand under former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. The author argues that the primary explanation for this contradiction lies in Thailand's post-1997 anti-corruption framework. Because of the ascendancy of a business2013politics nexus more powerful in blocking reform than Thai constitutional drafters had anticipated, and because of the decline in political contestability as a result of Thaksin's control of both the legislature and the executive, the stage was set for a dramatic increase in the levels of state capture. The author suggests that effective control of such political corruption calls for a strategy which extends far beyond the technocratic approaches used by Thai reformers in the mid to late 1990s.


  • Nils Bubandt (2006). Sorcery, corruption, and the dangers of democracy in Indonesia. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol.  12, No. 2, p. 413-431.

Abstract

 Magic is the continuation of politics by other means. This, at least, has been the case in North Maluku since the political reshuffle that followed the fall of Suharto and the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia. The strategies pursued by the regional elite to obtain lucrative positions in the new landscape opened up by regional autonomy are thus seen to be thwarted by sorcery from political rivals. Following the life and death of Muhammad, a North Malukan political entrepreneur, I show how sorcery plays an integral part in the new politics of democratization in Indonesia. Political sorcery thrives, I argue, in a complex moral economy that mixes local ideas of sociality, political practices of patrimonialism, and global discourses of democracy. Sorcery and corruption are part of the same political imagination, because both speak ambivalently to the problems of power in times of change. Rather than being anathema to democracy, as the new global discourse on transparency would have it, the occult politics of corruption and sorcery are among the means through which a contested form of democracy is conceptualized and implemented in Indonesia.


  • Mark E. Warren (2006). Democracy and Deceit: Regulating Appearances of Corruption.  American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 1, P. 160-174.

Abstract

 While corruption has long been recognized as an appropriate object of regulation, concern with appearances of corruption is of recent origin, coinciding with declining trust in government in the mid- to late-1960s. The reasoning that would support regulations of appearances, however, remains flawed, as it depends upon a "public trust" model of public service that is incomplete and often misplaced when applied to political representatives. The justification for regulating appearances is unambiguous, however, from the perspective of democratic theory. Democratic institutions of representation depend upon the integrity of appearances, not simply because they are an indication of whether political representatives are upholding their public trust, but because they provide the means through which citizens can judge whether, in particular instances, their trust is warranted. Representatives, institutions, and ethics that fail to support public confidence in appearances disempower citizens by denying them the means for inclusion in public judgments. These failures amount to a corruption of democratic processes.


  • Mushtaq H. Khan (1996). The efficiency implications of corruption. Journal of International Development, Vol. 8, No. 5, p. 683-696.

Abstract

 Corruption has different efficiency effects across countries. Conventional economic models of corruption are shown to be deficient in explaining these differences. Instead the article suggests that the distribution of power within the patron-client networks in which corruption is taking place is an important variable explaining the differences in the efficiency effects of corruption. Where patrons are powerful the range of rights transacted is limited and the allocation is likely to be efficiency maximizing. In contrast where patrons are weak the range of rights transacted is likely to be much wider with the rights allocated according to political calculations with large efficiency costs.


  • Xiaohui Xin and Thomas K. Rudel. (2004)The Context for Political Corruption: A Cross-National Analysis. Social Science Quarterly, Vo. 85, No. 2, p.294-309

Abstract

How do we explain variations across nations in the incidence of political corruption? Recent theoretical work locates the causes for corruption in a combination of institutional conditions: monopoly power, little accountability, and wide discretion. This focus on the form of political institutions clarifies the micro-scale causes of political corruption, but it leaves unanswered questions about the macro-scale causes of corruption. This article addresses these questions about the macro scale through an analysis of perceived levels of corruption across nations. Our work identifies poverty, large populations, and small public sectors as contextual causes of corruption. Historically-based differences in political cultures across broad geographical regions also affect the perceived incidence of corruption in nations. Further research should attempt to link micro- and macro-scale causes together in a single, multi-scalar model of corruption.


  • Verena Fritz. (2007). Democratisation and corruption in Mongolia. ublic Administration and Development, Vo. 27, No. 3, P. 191-203.

Abstract

More democratic and open systems of government are generally assumed to contain corruption. Subsequent to the end of the communist system in 1990, Mongolia has established a democratic regime, and has been assessed as being relatively well governed. However, more recently, corruption has been worsening, despite the continuation of a democratic regime.This article inquires into the drivers of corruption and into the reasons for why accountability has not been more effective despite a democratic form of government. The availability of three major forms of rents - foreign aid, privatisation and natural resource extraction - is discussed as important drivers. The recent mining boom appears to have reinforced weaknesses in Mongolia's system of accountability. Underlying weaknesses include certain communist legacies, especially of intransparent government and of a dependent judicial system, and substantially increased inequality as a result of transition.


  • Philippe Le Billon (2003). Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts. Journal of International Development, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 413-426.

Abstract

Although corruption may have a corrosive effect on economies and rule-based institutions, it also forms part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflict may be engendered more by changes in the pattern of corruption than by the existence of corruption itself. Such changes, frequently associated with domestic or external shocks, can lead to armed conflict as increasingly violent forms of competitive corruption between factions lsquofuel warrsquo by rewarding belligerents. Controversially, lsquobuying-offrsquo belligerents can facilitate a transition to peace; but lsquosticksrsquo such as economic sanctions, rather than lsquocarrotsrsquo, have dominated international conflict resolution instruments. While lsquobuying peacersquo can present a short-term solution, the key challenge for peace-building initiatives and fiscal reforms is to shift individual incentives and rewards away from the competition for immediate corrupt gains. This may be facilitated by placing public revenues under international supervision during peace processes. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • Alex Kondos (1987) The Question of 'Corruption' in Nepal. Mankind, Vol. 17, no. 1, p. 15-29.

Abstract

Drawing on ethnographic material about a set of Nepalese cultural practices known as 'nutabad 2014ciypabad', 'favouritism', the paper attempts; first, to chart the meaning favouritism has for Nepalis in their everyday encounters with central administration and the forms these interactions take and their cultural significations; second, to examine the way the idea of favouritism is constructed by the Westernized intellectuals to mean corruption and their reasons for so doing. The key sociological concept utilized for this analysis is 'power', specifically its operation in the field of political ethics centring on a conflict between two opposing ideologies; one advocated by the Westernized intellectuals who are pressing for the adoption of the principle of 'impartiality' in government; the other being that which is inherent in the Hindu traditional mode of statecraft wherein the institution of 'the favour' and therefore 'partiality' as a value is paramount and is in accord with Hindu cultural values, generally.


  • Jennifer Hasty (2005) The Pleasures of Corruption: Desire and Discipline in Ghanaian Political Culture. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 271-301.

Abstract

This article juxtaposes popular understandings of corruption in public discourse with official practices of anticorruption in the institutions of the state in Ghana. Although global disciplinary campaigns against corruption target selfishness and greed, local practices of anticorruption intersect with affectively engaged social desires. These social desires are profoundly shaped by local notions of articulation, pressure, and flow, and they are mobilized by communal desire as well as material. I examine two distinct conceptualizations of corruption in popular media that illustrate the link between corruption and socially embedded desire and then move behind the scenes to the realm of corruption investigations at the Ghanaian Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).


  • Akhil Gupta (1995). Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state. American Ethnologist, Vol. 22, No. 2, p.75-402.

Abstract

 In this article I attempt to do an ethnography of the state by examining the discourses of corruption in contemporary India. I focus on the practices of lower levels of the bureaucracy in a small north Indian town as well as on representations of the state in the mass media. Research on translocal institutions such as "the state" enables us to reflect on the limitations of participant-observation as a technique of fieldwork. The analysis leads me to question Eurocentric distinctions between state and civil society and offers a critique of the conceptualization of "the state" as a monolithic and unitary entity. [the state, public culture, fieldwork, discourse, corruption, India]


  • John Mukum Mbaku (2009) Corruption in Africa Part 1. History Compass, Vol. 7, No. 5, p. 1269-1285

Abstract

 As Africans struggled against colonial exploitation, there was near universal agreement among the freedom fighters and other nationalists that one of the most important determinants of poverty in the colonies was the control of the instruments of economic and political governance by foreign interlopers, all of whose objectives were in conflict with those of the Africans. Colonial institutional arrangements were primarily instruments for the exploitation of Africans and their resources. Europeans came to Africa to maximize metropolitan objectives and hence, established within each colony, institutional arrangements that enhanced their ability to exploit Africans and their resources for the benefit of the metropolitan economies. With their comparative advantage in the employment of military and police force, the Europeans were able to impose on the African colonies laws and institutions that enhanced their objectives but significantly impoverished Africans. Hence, independence was considered critical not only to the elimination of the psychological effects of foreign occupation but also to the empowerment of Africans and the enhancement of their ability to take full control of their governance systems. First, independence was expected to expel the European interlopers from the continent and allow the in-coming African leaders to rid their societies of the exploitative, despotic and non-democratic institutions that had been brought to the colonies by the Europeans. In the post-independence period, Africans were expected to have full control of their own destiny, allocate their own resources, and generally take responsibility for the design and implementation of policies affecting their own welfare. Second, the new leaders were then expected to engage all relevant stakeholder groups in each country in democratic constitution making to develop and adopt locally focused, participatory, inclusive and politically and economically relevant institutional arrangements. Finally, Africa's post-independence leaders were expected to use public policy as an instrument for the effective eradication of mass poverty and deprivation.


  • Tat Yan Kong (1996). Corruption and its Institutional Foundations: The Experience of South Korea. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 48-55 Institute of Development Studies

Abstract

 In spite of the reformist rhetoric of South Korea's first post-military administration inaugurated in 1993, the institutional foundations of corruption remain intact - the government-big business relationship in which donations are exchanged for favourable official consideration of the business sector. Recent measures to accelerate economic liberalization have strengthened the bargaining power of the business sector in relation to the government rather than replacing collusion with competition. The absence of countervailing power to the government-business nexus and the current conservative political agenda reflect the incomplete nature of the democratic transition since 1987 and contribute to the persistence of corruption.


  • Miroslav Beblavý (2009) Conditions for effective large-scale anticorruption efforts and the role of external actors: What does the Slovak experience tell us? Public Administration and Development, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 180-192

Abstract

The article looks at what policy-makers can do to decrease corruption in developing and transition countries, based on an in-depth examination of effectiveness of actual anticorruption measures in Slovakia. The research presents a synthesis of 12 case studies where measures in the sectors most associated with corruption as well as horizontal measures were analysed. The research shows that corruption can be decreased significantly within several years and external actors can play a substantial role in the process. An overall decrease in corruption can be based on aggregation of individual sectoral changes in areas most suffering from graft. In particular, the Slovak strategy was based on a sector-by-sector economic approach to resolve supply-demand imbalances based on either liberalisation/privatisation, limitations on discretion or managing supply and/or demand. Horizontal reforms complemented by sectoral reforms with their strong focus on increasing transparency. Concerning the role of external actors, we conclude that even when there is a domestically driven anticorruption effort, the external actors can still help significantly by serving as sources of inspiration, legitimacy, know-how and funding for reform design and implementation.

 

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